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1 Introduction
Using aggregate data at the airline level, we analyze worldwide airline alliances. We
suggest that airlines inside alliances cut prices by 5% on average. We also propose an
empirical model that allows us to evaluate to which extend two airlinesnetworks are
substitutes. We suggest that a signicant number of airlines enrolled in the same alliances
o¤er services which can be considered as substitutes, which could lead to anti-competitive
practices. We also evaluate price cost margins for each alliance and shed light on whether
these margins obey to some Nash pricing behavior.
There is increasing evidence suggesting that strategic alliances between otherwise in-
dependent rms have become commonplace in a wide variety of industries. According to
Oster (1994), a strategic alliance could be dened as an arrangement in which two or more
rms combine resources outside the market in order to accomplish a particular task or
set of tasks. In the airline industry, deregulation has triggered several waves of alliances
between worldwide airlines. Alliances between airlines are mainly designed to achieve
eet rationalization, expansion and rationalization of network structure as well as greater
exploitation of cost economies. In particular, international airlines have the opportunity
to extend their networks to foreign countries by entering an alliance agreement with a for-
eign airline. By coordinating their services or production processes, alliance partners can
o¤er greater convenience to consumers, including access to connecting services, greater
e¢ ciencies and procedural operations in ticketing, ground handling and baggage handling,
expanded route networks and connecting options.
Airlines can engage as well in cooperative pricing, while enjoying antitrust immunity.
Strategic alliances in the airline industry have attracted more antitrust attention than any
others.1 Many types of alliances have been adopted by airlines, ranging from agreements
that involve relatively little cooperation such as frequent yer programs to agreements
commonly known as code sharing practices that involve the sharing of costly assets such
as planes, terminals, counters, crews and more (see Oum and Park, 1997, for more details
on the forms of alliances in the airline industry). Code sharing arrangements have been
until very recently the most popular form of alliance adopted by airlines. In this case,
two companies operating two connecting routes o¤er an interline trip that is ticketed as
1The European Commission Article 81 and 82 Treaty states that the Commission can exempt an
alliance if it considers that the economic e¢ ciencies and overall benets of the transaction outweigh the
anti-competitive e¤ects.
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if the two components were served by one single airline.
Economic studies focusing on the e¤ect of airline alliances on welfare have identied
various counter powered e¤ects. Oum, Park, and Zhang (1996), Brueckner and Whalen
(2000), Brueckner (2001 and 2003), and Whalen (2007) among others have focused on the
competitive e¤ects of international alliances. Bamberger, Carlton and Neumann (2004)
among others have investigated domestic alliances. These authors suggest that, if the
corresponding networks of the alliance members o¤er the possibility of connecting many
routes, they can be regarded as complements. In this case, rms cooperate on routes that
were not individually served before, but are created by connecting networks. Accordingly,
after the alliance, both prices and costs will fall and both buyers and sellers will be better
o¤. In contrast, if the corresponding networks of alliance members used to overlap for a
large number of routes, they can be regarded as substitutes (parallel alliances). In this
case, the rms share planes on routes that they both used to served individually. This
results in softer competition, and therefore, higher prices.
We aim at considering all the international alliances that were operating between 1995
and 2000, using annual aggregate data on rmsbalance sheets, capacity and demand
levels. We empirically analyze whether the network of individual alliance members is
a substitute or a complement for the other alliance members network. To do so, we
estimate a cost, capacity, and demand system for airline companies, accounting for cross-
price elasticities. Estimating demand entails proposing a original procedure in the specic
context of the airline industry that allows reducing the number of cross price elasticity
parameters to be estimated. In particular, we account for connecting and overlapping
route between airlinesnetworks.
We also test for the e¤ects of alliances on airlinesaggregate prices and costs. We
conrm that being a member of an alliance entails cutting prices signicantly with respect
to airlines from outside alliances. However, we do not nd any signicant e¤ect of the
alliances on airlinesoperating costs. Finally, we retrieve cost and demand parameters,
construct marginal costs, and derive price-cost margins for each airline and alliance. We
want to test whether some general pricing behavior can be observed at the airline level,
i.e., we test whether pricing policies by airlines correspond to Nash pricing. Our results
suggest that companies outside the alliances su¤er from lower price-costs margins than
those within alliances, even if, on average, they set higher prices.
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows: The next section presents a discussion of
the data we use and the associated methodology. Section 3 proposes to construct airlines
networks substitution indexes. Section 4 presents the basic capacity, demand and cost
ingredients which are inherent to our airline model. Section 5 focuses on the empirical
implementation of the model. In particular, functional forms and the estimation procedure
are presented. We develop in this section the procedure we use in order to model the price
demand interactions between the di¤erent companiesnetworks of our dataset. Section
6 discusses our estimation procedure. In particular, we present the instruments we use
to proxy airlinesfares in the demand equation. Section 7 is dedicated to the description
of the dataset and the construction of the variables. Section 8 presents the estimation
results. Section 9 proposes an evaluation of competitive forces in the industry.
2 Discussing the data and the model
In what follows we specify a model of airlinesbehavior that entails estimating the in-
ternational demand faced by each airline as well as its technology. The ideal modelling
approach consists in working at the airline-route level. This approach has been followed by
Borenstein (1989), Oum, Park, and Zhang (1996), Brueckner and Whalen (2000), Brueck-
ner (2001 and 2003), or Whalen (2007), where a specic market is an origin destination
pair. Given that airlines take di¤erent price and capacity decisions on each market they
operate, working at the airline-route level allows the researcher to observe and account
for each market characteristics such as the number and identity of the competitors, the
length of the route, or the prices of each product available.
In this paper, we are interested in shedding light on alliance e¤ects on airlinesbehavior
at a more aggregate level, i.e., at the airline level. Our motivation is twofold: First, the
researcher focusing on non-U.S. airlines is usually constrained by the quality of the data
available, which makes any work at the airline-route level unfeasible.2 Second, we aim
at advocating the idea that airlines may take corporate and strategical decisions at the
2Data at the airline-route level are provided by the U.S. Department of Transportation. The database
allows observing only interline trips where at least one route segment is own on a U.S. airline. This
implies for instance that it contains information on the United-Lufthansa or United-SAS pairs, but it
does not on the routes jointly operated by Lufthansa and SAS. Data at the airline-route level for airlines
outside the U.S. are in general very limited. For instance, the world air transport statistics published by
the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the Air Transport Association (IATA) do not
contain observations on ticket prices at the route level.
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entire network level. An airline enters an alliance in order to expend its network overseas
to destinations points that it could not reach otherwise, because of the high xed costs
induced, or because most countries do not permit cabotage by foreign companies. The
decision of an airline to join an alliance and eventually nd appropriate solutions to
reorganize its productive structure a¤ects its operating costs and the demand it faces
at the network level. Airlines serve a large number of interconnected routes that form a
network. Sometimes consumers buy a companys service in one single route (what is known
as a direct ight) but very often they buy sets of (normally two or three) interconnected
routes (indirect ights through one or two hubs). Additionally, when buying a ticket in
an individual route, frequent consumers take into account the companys network size
and characteristics, since this a¤ects the exibility to make further interconnections if
needed, exchange tickets, take alternative routes and even enjoy frequent yer prizes and
discounts. Scope economies among routes and network e¤ects (almost) impose a common
policy to all the routes served by a given airline.3
In other words, we aim at proposing a di¤erent approach based on aggregate data
which attempts to derive lessons at the airlinesnetwork level rather than the route level.
We propose two main contributions: First, we test for the impact of the formation of
alliances on airlines annual prices and costs. We suggest that price reductions due to
alliances are strong enough so that they can be identied through annual prices. We
nd no empirical evidence however on the e¤ect of alliances on airlinesoperating costs.
Second, we propose an original demand framework that accounts for the intensity of
competition in each airlines main hub. In particular, we account for the proportions
of overlapping and connecting route kilometers between two airlines main hub. We
identify a substitution index cut-o¤ above which two airlinesnetworks can be considered
as substitutes.
The dataset has been constructed for the period 1995-2000 from raw data included in
Digest of Statistics published by International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),World
Air Transport Statistics published by International Air Transport Association (IATA),
and Economic Outlook published by the Economics and Statistics Department of the Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) as well as airlines annual
3This type of aggregate approach has been mostly used by authors measuring the e¤ects of the
European airline deregulation on airlinescosts reductions. This is the case for instance in Good et al.
(1993), Neven et al. (1996 and 2001), Röller and Sickles (2000), Marín (1998), and Gagnepain and Marin
(2006).
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reports. The companies under study are worldwide airlines with special attention to the
U.S. and the E.U. airlines, which usually constitute the main alliance partners. Some
of the airlines belong to international alliances and some others operate as independent
airlines. The dataset includes observations for a total of 55 airline airlines, as shown in
table 1. Table 2 presents a list of the di¤erent alliances members.
3 A measure of network substitution
We propose a methodology based on airlines total networks. We dene rst in this
section a measure of substitution between two airlinesnetworks. To illustrate our aim,
we present an example in Figure 1, where ve airlines operate services on ve networks.
Some networks have no overlapping routes: This is the case for instance of network 1
and 2, which have a city (I) in common, but no overlapping routes. These two networks
are said to be complements. As the number of overlapping route kilometers between two
networks increases, so does the degree of substitutability between them. Networks 1 and
3 have one route in common; in particular, they share two cities, B and I. Networks 1
and 4 have two routes in common, given that they both operate at cities B, I, and H.
Finally, networks 1 and 5 share all routes (cities A, B, I, and H), which makes them
perfect substitutes.
Hence, counting the number of route kilometers that two networks have in common
allows us to derive a substitutability index between two networks. This in turn enables us
to shed light on the degree of substitutability between two (average products of) airlines.
Note however that, due to data restriction, we do not have detailed information on the
activity of airlines on each route they operate. We are nevertheless able to observe airlines
operations in their respective hub. This is a potential drawback, since we do not observe
the entire activity of an airline, but we are condent that the observation of airlines
activity through their hubs provides a fair instrument, as the hub is the center of gravity
of airlinesoperations.4
In gure 2, we illustrate how the measure of the airlinesnetwork substitutability can
be translated at the level of airlineshubs. Consider two airlines 1 and 2 with respective
4If a carrier has several hubs (which is the case of many American carriers), the most important hub
in terms of supply is accounted for. A detailed description of all companieshubs as well as the level of
supply operated from each of them is available upon request.
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hubsH1 andH2; from which they operate their services. In 2.a., the number of overlapping
routes between 1 and 2 is at its minimum level, i.e., airline 1 (2 resp.) does not propose
any service in 2s (1s resp.) network besides the route that links H1 and H2. The two
airlinesservices are said to be complementary in this case, and it is very much alike the
case of networks 1 and 2 in Figure 1. In 2.b., Airline 1 (2 resp.) may decentralize a
share of its operations to H2 (H1), increasing thus the degree of substitutability between
1 and 2s operations. This situation is similar to the networks pairs 1-3 and 1-4 above.
Finally, in 2.c., both companieshubs coincide, setting the degree of substitutability of
both activities at the maximum level, as in the case of the network pair 1-5 above.
We construct our substitution index as follows: Consider two airlines i and j. We
suggest that the degree of substitutability (complementarity resp.) between the total
operations of two airline airlines i and j increases (decreases resp.) with the share of
route kilometers departing from i and js hubs and that i and j have in common. Dene
Oij as airline is share of hub route kilometers also served by airline j. Likewise, dene
Oji as airline js share of hub route kilometers also served by airline i. Moreover, denote
as Ti (Tj) the total hub route kilometers for airline i ( j). Hence, the substitution index
is dened as Oi j =
(Oij+Oji)
(Ti+Tj)
: Note that a higher degree of substitution between i and j
implies therefore that Oi j increases.
We proceed in a similar fashion to construct a complementarity index between both
airlines i and j. Dene as Cij the quantity of airline is hub route kilometers not served
by airline j; and Cji the quantity of airline js hub route kilometers not served by airline
i. Provided with these components it is possible to dene Ci j =
(Cij+Cji)
(Ti+Tj)
: Hence, a
higher degree of complementarity between i and j implies therefore an increase of Ci j.
Moreover, Ci j = 1 Oi j.
From our 55 airlines, we determine all the possible airline pairs. Out of the 1485
possibilities, 444 pairs are characterized by overlapping activities. We calculate the sub-
stitution index Oi j for each of them. Table 3 presents a list of the 87 airline pairs with
the highest indexes. Some of these airline pairs present high substitution indexes because
they operate from the same hub. This is the case for instance of All Nippon and Japan
airlines (Hub: Tokyo), British Airways and Virgin Atlantic (Hub: London), Aeromexico
and Mexicana (Hub: Mexico City), or Air Europa and Spanair (Hub: Madrid). Other
pairs operate from distinct hubs located in the same domestic markets: Delta and TWA
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(Hubs: Atlanta and St Louis), and Air Canada and Canadian Airlines (Toronto and
Calgary) for instance. Finally, one observes pairs of airlines with distinct hubs located
in di¤erent countries. High substitution indexes in this case implies that these airlines
operate a signicant share of their total activity in their competitors hub. Examples are
Qantas and Thai (Hubs: Sydney and Bangkok), and British Airways and United (Hubs:
London and Chicago).
Determining whether two airlines operations can actually be considered as substi-
tutes or complements requires the denition of a substitution index cut-o¤. This can
be achieved through the estimation of a demand function for world airlinesoperations,
which constitutes the core of the analysis presented in this paper.
4 Cost, capacity, and demand
An airline o¤ers a specic capacity determined by the total number of seats available in the
airplanes, and the total mileage performed. Based on this supply and prices, consumers
make optimizing travel decisions that consist of a particular number of trips. Hence, as
already suggested by numerous authors, passenger-trips are not as much under the control
of operators, and airlines are concerned by the capacity to produce a potential for trips
(See Berechman, 1993.). In other words, costs and revenues are driven by two di¤erent
variables that are closely related. It is thus crucial to disentangle the capacity supplied,
Q, and the level of transport services requested by the customers, q.
Since the capacity supplied must at least meet the highest peaks of tra¢ c, demand
never saturates the network capacity on average. On the other hand, the capacity must
be adjusted to the level of demand, so the former is endogenous to the latter. Here we
do not present a complete model of optimal provision of transport services. Instead, we
simply introduce a reduced form of a technical adjustment process between capacity and
demand according to the relation that we specify as follows:
Qi = (qi; ); (1)
where  is a vector of parameters to be estimated. This equation just approximates how
engineers adjust the network size and structure to the demand level on annual basis.
For the specication of the demand function, we follow the classical guidelines. As-
8
sume that from consumer ns indirect utility associated with the consumption of air trans-
portation we can derive the individual demand function. This function is interpreted as a
short-run demand since it takes the capacity Q as given. By replacing Q in this demand
function by its expression in (1), we obtain a reduced form interpreted as the long-run
demand function which is dened as
qi(pi; pj;mi; ); i = 1; :::; N; j 6= i; (2)
where  is a vector of parameters. Firm is aggregate demand qi depends on its own
price, pi, competitorsprices pj, as well as market exogenous characteristics mi. A limited
number of competitors meets in each route, with the combination of competitors changing
from one route to another. Di¤erent competitors supply alternative products which di¤er
in time schedule, number of stops, availability of interconnections with other ights, etc.
In addition, at the two ends of each route start other routes that can be served by the
same or a di¤erent set of airlines. Accordingly, the services o¤ered by di¤erent airlines
can be regarded either as imperfect substitutes or complements. By assuming the same
pricing policy for all the routes served by one company, we are implicitly saying that pj
represents the price asked by the di¤erent rms in the market, and this price accounts for
the fact that the routes served by rms are complements or substitutes of those served
by rm i.
The price elasticity associated with this reduced-form demand corresponds to an es-
timate of the long-run elasticity, when capacity has been fully adjusted. Estimating
Equations (1) and (2) avoids the simultaneity problem that exists between supply and
demand.
Moreover, airlines are endowed with a given technology. In order to provide a given
amount of service, Qi, an airline must buy variable inputs, namely, labor, Li and materials,
Mi, which productivity depends on network exogenous characteristics, zi. The production
process and its underlying technology can be implemented through a long-run dual cost
function. Denoting by wL and wM the price of labor and materials, the cost function is:
Ci = C(Qi; !i; zi; t; Ai; ); (3)
where t is a trend, and  is a vector of parameters denoting technology. Note moreover
that we test for the alliances e¤ect on the companys costs. Ai is a dummy variable that
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takes value 1 if the observe airline is part of an alliance, and 0 otherwise.
Our econometric model comprises three equations in a block-recursive structure, so
that each equation can be estimated separately. The lower level provides the demand of
transport that explains the demand (usage) of transport in terms of the transportation
price, which is endogenous, and needs to be proxied. We will go back to this point below.
The middle level is constituted by Equation (1) that provides a relationship between
demand and capacity (or supply). This equation just says that, at each period, one can
identify the engineering function that has been used to set up the network structure in
terms of size. The upper level is made of the cost function, which relates cost to capacity
and to other elements like the inputs prices and the e¤ect of alliances.
Note that we do not attempt to estimate rmspricing strategy simultaneously with
our Aforementioned equations. The reason is that, since we work at the aggregate level,
making any assumption on the averagepricing conduct of airlines would not help to
improve the quality of our estimates. We will provide further discussion on this aspect in
Section 9.
5 Empirical implementation
The next step consists in proposing specic functional forms for our three equations. In
particular, we explain how our demand function identies the cross price e¤ects between
each pair of airlines observed in our database.
The demand equation corresponding to (2) is specied in linear form as follows
qi = 1i + 2ipi +
X
j 6=i
i jpj + m mi + uqi, i; j = 1; :::; N; (4)
where uqi is an error term. Notice that we allow the intercept 1i and the own-price
e¤ects 2i to vary across airlines. Moreover, we account for rms cross-price specic
e¤ects i j. These characteristics imply a matrix of own and cross-price e¤ects
@qi
@pj
that
can only be estimated imposing some constraints. Following the approach suggested by
Jaumandreu and Lorences (2002), we assume that own-price and cross-price e¤ects must
follow some pattern.
First, we assume that the intercept and the total own-price e¤ect of each airline are
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proportional to the size of its own network. Accordingly, we dene 1i = 0 + 1NETi
and 2i = 2NETi, i.e., we assume that the own rate e¤ect of an airline depends on the
size of its operations.
Second, the total cross-price e¤ect of a rival j depends on the extend to which js
network is a substitute or a complement to is network. We therefore weight airlines
coincidences and potential connections with all their rivals. In particular, we dene i j =
3 Oi j +4 Ci j, where 3 and 4 are the common cross-price e¤ects and Oi j and Ci j
are the two overlapping and connecting indexes dened above. We expect 3 and 4 to be
positive and negative respectively, i.e., a higher proportion of overlapping route kilometers
Oi j (connecting route kilometers Ci j resp.) between two airlines i and j makes it more
likely for these airlines to be substitutes (complements resp.).
Dening poij = Oi j pj, and p
c
ij = Ci j pj, expression (4) can be transformed into an
equation with only two cross-price parameters 3 and 4 to be estimated,
qi = 0 + 1NETi + 2NETipi + 3
X
j 6=i
poij + 4
X
j 6=i
pcij +
m mi + uqi, i; j = 1; :::; N: (5)
Note that the whole matrix of own and cross-price e¤ects can be recovered from this
estimation for a given set of values of NETi, the Oi j and Ci j variables, and the 
coe¢ cients. Moreover, we dene the minimum value of the substitution coe¢ cient Oi j
from which two airline i and airline j can be considered as substitutes: We need i j > 0,
i.e., Oi j >   43 4 . Likewise, two airlines are complements when Oi j <   43 4 .
We turn now to the two other equations. We assume a Cobb-Douglas specication for
the cost function in (3). This specication retains the main properties desirable for a cost
function and provides a su¢ ciently precise description of the technology, while remaining
tractable for our purpose.5 The cost function is then specied as
Ci = 0 !
1
Li!
2
MiQ
3
i zi exp(t t+ uci) (6)
where uci is an error term. Homogeneity of degree one in input prices is imposed, i.e.,
1 + 2 = 1. We assume that zi includes measures of airlinesnetwork size, NETi, and
5See Marín (1998) for details on the same choice for the airline industry
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average stage length, ASLi,6 and has the following shape:
zi = NET
4
i ASL
5
i : (7)
Note that the average stage length measures the length of the average route operated
by an airline while the network size adds the lenghts of all routes of the airlines network.
With respect to the relationship between demand, qi, and supply, Qi, represented in (1),
we assume the following functional form,
Qi = 0 q
1
i exp(uQi); (8)
where uQi is an error term.
6 Estimation
We estimate the sequential system of equations (5), (6) and (8). Since prices pi in the
demand equation (5) are endogenous, we need to nd some instruments. We use as
instruments for pi a trend t, the national private consumption in the airlines country of
origin, PRIVi, the size of population of the airlines country of origin, POPi, wages, !Li,
a measure of competition COMPi, and a dummy indicating whether the airline belongs
to an alliance or not, Ai (All these variables are discussed in more details in the next
section). Hence, we estimate the following additional equation:
pi = p (Ai; PRIVi; POPi; !Li; COMPi; t; ) , i = 1; :::; N; (9)
where  is a vector of parameters. Several comments are worth emphasizing: First,
note that we test whether alliances have any impact on the global average price set by
airlines using a simple dummy, in a similar fashion as in the cost equation. This procedure
is similar to the one used by Brueckner and Whalen (2001) and Whalen (2007) with two
di¤erences: They measure the e¤ects of codesharing and immunity agreements on prices
while we rather focus on the e¤ect of being a member of an alliance without specifying
6See Marín (1998) and Neven et al. (2001) for discussions on the introduction of these two variables
in the cost function and for evidence on their e¤ects on airlines productivity. A measure of airport
concentration was included in an alternative specication but it turned out to be highly correlated with
the size of the network.
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with precision the nature of the agreement. Moreover, as already mentioned, these authors
work at the route (market) level while we focus on economic indicators aggregated at
the network level. Note however that they consider that the codesharing and immunity
agreements apply to all the products o¤ered by airlines while in practice these agreements
are e¤ective in some specic markets only. In a sense, this generalizationof airlines
cooperative behaviors generates an average e¤ect on prices that is similar to our measures
to some extent.
Second, entering an alliance is a decision of the airline and this has several conse-
quences in our model: We should proxy the alliance variable Ai since it is most probably
endogenous. This is however a di¢ cult task due to the fact that very few instruments
are left in our database. We run several logit estimations on the choice of entering an
alliance or not and obtained results where a trend, airlineswages, and the (1995) airlines
network size signicantly a¤ect the probability to enter an alliance. Note however that
these instruments (which are plugged in the price equation) create important collinearity
problems once prices are proxied in the demand equation. We therefore decided to dis-
card the idea of proxying the decision to enter an alliance. Further comments on the logit
estimation results are provided in section 8.
Another consequence is that the overlapping and connection indexes Oi j and Ci j
may themselves be decision variables of airlines. In order to avoid endogeneity problems at
this level, we keep both Oi j and Ci j xed over time, i.e., we use the initial 1995 indexes
to proxy the degree of substitution and connection between airlines over the whole period
of observation.
Finally, we compute several robustness checks to test the validity of our estimates of
own and cross price elasticities. We show that the own elasticities do not vary much when
prices are proxied or not. We also try other specications of the demand equation. In
particular, we replace NETi in the expression of the constant and the own price parameter
by the number of airlines ights departures DEPi and the number of routes ROUTESi.
We suggest that these changes entail minor variation in the results.
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7 Variables denition
The variables have been constructed as follows. In the cost function, total costs (Ci), pro-
duction (Qi), wages (!Li), and average stage length (ASLi) correspond to total operating
expenses, seat-kilometers available, ight crew salaries and maintenance and overhaul
expenses over number of employees, and total aircraft kilometers over total aircraft de-
partures (DEPi), respectively. With respect to total costs, companies report one single
gure that corresponds to passengers, freight and mail activities. The distribution of op-
erations among these three activities can vary signicantly among companies. However,
it is easy to obtain information on the total number of tonne-Kilometers performed that
correspond to passengers (including baggage), freight and mail, respectively. We mul-
tiply total costs reported by each company by the share of tones-kilometers performed
corresponding to passengers in order to compute our cost variable (Ci).
The variable NETi is the total number of route kilometers an airline operates on all its
di¤erent routes (ROUTESi). Finally, the price of materials (!Mi) has been constructed
as the average fuel prices at the airlines home country and at the OECD, weighted by
the companys domestic and international operations respectively.
On the demand side, demand (qi) corresponds to passenger-kilometers performed,
and prices (pi) are measured as passenger revenues over passenger-kilometers performed.
The home country exogenous characteristic mi is domestic private consumption PRIVi.
Finally, t the time trend, is equal to one in 1995 and incremented by one each year.
We also construct a competition index COMPi for each airline i, which accounts
for the number and the intensities of coincidences of is network with other airlines
networks. We have dened previously the substitution index Oi j =
(Oij+Oji)
(Ti+Tj)
as the
share of route kilometers departing from two airlines i and js hubs and that i and j
have in common. Summing Oi j over all airlines j which coincide with i, we obtain a
measure of the competition index, COMPi =
P
j Oi j for airline i. Thus, airline i faces
a higher competitive pressure if COMPi increases, i.e., if i shares a higher quantity of
route kilometers with its competitors.
Finally, we need to construct a variable to account for the alliances e¤ects in the
price and cost equations. Airlines cooperate with partners which are the members of
the same alliance, i.e., ONE, SKY, STAR, WINGS, and QUAL. We construct a dummy
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ALLIi which takes value one if the observed airline is a member of any of these alliances,
and zero otherwise. Note that it is implicitly assumed that being a member of one of
these alliances entails that an airline sets cooperative prices in all the markets where it is
present.
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics.
8 Demand elasticity and costs
Tables 5 to 11 provide the results for the econometric model. Prior to estimating the
demand function (5), we need to obtain estimated prices p^i through the price equation
(9). As a by-product, we test several price determinants, as presented in Table (5). We
obtain price outcomes that are similar to the empirical results obtained by Brueckner and
Whalen (2000) and Whalen (2007), although these authors work at a more disaggregated
level, i.e., on a market (route) basis. First, note that prices decrease at an annual rate of
4 to 7% as suggested by the trend. Second, prices are higher, on average, if the domestic
private consumption inside the home country of the observed airline is more important.
Third, the size of the population of the home country of the observed airline and the
price are inversely related, which suggests that this variable is a potential proxy for the
quantity of passengers-kilometers carried.
Note that the average wage paid to the employees of the airline is not a relevant
determinant of the price, suggesting that a direct connection between airlinesprices and
costs is potentially loose. Whether or not an airline is a member of an alliance has a
signicant impact. On average, prices are 5 to 6% lower under alliances. This is an
interesting result, given the highly aggregated nature of the data. Although airlines
establish strategic price interactions on a market to market basis, prices reductions are
important enough so that this reductions can be identied in annual average prices at
the airline level. Interacting the alliance variable with our measure of competition yields
the expected negative results, i.e., prices are lower for alliance members facing a higher
competitive pressure.
As suggested previously, we also estimate the decision of airlines to enter an alliance.7
7The estimated probability to enter an alliance is Pr =  30:62
(1:59)
+ 6:91
(1:33)
TREND +1:59
(0:30)
NET  0:61
(0:31)
WAGES. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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Replacing ALLIi in the price equation by this estimated probability reduces signicantly
the magnitude of the alliance e¤ect (-1% instead of -5%), although the alliance outcome
remains negative and highly signicant. This suggests a potential endogeneity bias: Air-
lines entering alliances may enjoy lower marginal costs than those not entering. Not
accounting for this issue may lead to an overstatement of the alliance e¤ects on prices.
From the di¤erent price specications in Table 5, we derive measures p^i which are in-
troduced in our demand equation. Tables 6-8 present the results for the demand equation.
Table 6 shows the results of the demand equation (5). In Tables 7 and 8, we produce
alternative estimates obtained from the estimation of (5) where NETi is replaced by the
number of routes, ROUTESi, and the number of departures DEPi, respectively. All the
coe¢ cients have the expected signs. As expected, demand increases signicantly with the
size of the network, the number of aircraft departures, or the number of routes operated.
Likewise, private consumption growth a¤ects positively demand. The own price parame-
ter 2 is negative and signicant, and do not vary much depending on whether the size
of the network, the number of routes, or the number of departures enter the specication
of the own price demand elasticity. Note moreover that, from Table 6, plugging into the
demand function the real observed price pi (Column A) or the estimated p^i (Columns I
to V) do not a¤ect much 2. With respect to cross price estimates, it appears that 3
(4 resp.) is positive (negative resp.) and signicant. This result suggests that a higher
proportion of overlapping route kilometers between two airlines i and j makes it more
likely for these airlines to be substitutes. Likewise, a higher proportion of connecting
route kilometers between two airlines i and j makes it more likely for these airlines to be
complements.
From the estimation of the own price parameter 2 obtained in Tables 6-8, we evaluate
the own price demand elasticity as ii = 2NETi 

pi
qi

: We obtain estimates between
 1:51 and  1:99 for the average airline airline over the period considered.8 More inter-
estingly, using the cross price demand parameters 3 and 4, we derive the substitution
index cut-o¤ Oi j =   43 4 above which two airlines can be considered as substitutes.
From Table 6 (7 and 8 resp.), the cut-o¤ is equal to 0.180 (0.077 and 0.113 resp.)9 Hence,
8A survey by Oum et al. (1992) on price elasticities of air transport demand suggests that empirical
ndings obtained during the 80s usually lie between -4.51 and -0.4. The fact that our estimate gets closer
to the lower bound should not be surprising given that our database mostly consider long-distance routes
where price-sensitive holiday-makers form the majority of travellers.
9We keep the worst case scenario from each table.
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the number of substitute airlines is 12, 31, or 57, which represents respectively 2.7, 6.9,
and 12.8% of the airline pairs characterized by overlapping activities.
Table 9 identies the pairs of airlines whose services are substitutes, depending on
each cut-o¤ value Oi j. Airlines pairs which are members of the same alliances over
1995-2000 are underlined. Airline pairs which become members of the same alliance after
our period of observation are underlined and in italic. Interestingly, a signicant number
of pairs of substitute airlines belongs to the same alliance, which may lead to softer
competition and higher prices. Among the pairs with the highest substitution index are
SAS and Thai, (Star Alliance from 1997), Continental and Delta (Skyteam from 2004),
or Canadian Airlines and Cathay (OneWorld from 1999). Note also the presence of the
pair American Airlines-British airways (OneWorld since 1998) which required antitrust
immunity on transatlantic routes in 1997 and 2001 without success, or the pair Lufthansa-
United which got granted antitrust immunity in 1997 under very specic restrictions on
some particular routes such as Washington/Frankfurt and Chicago/Frankfurt.10 More
recently, the European Commission opened two antitrust proceedings against these four
airlines together with other members of Star Alliance (Air Canada and Continental) and
OneWorld (Iberia) in relation to cooperation on transatlantic routes.11 The Commission
is willing to assess whether cooperation among these airlines may lead to restrictions of
competition on certain routes. These cases illustrate that a methodology based on network
substitution such as the one presented in this paper may be a relevant tool for regulators
when deciding whether or not two airlines should not allowed to implement cooperative
arrangements. We will propose in a last section alternative alliance compositions which
do not include substitute airlines. Before doing so we turn to the capacity and cost side
of our results.
Table 10 presents the demand-capacity relationship. Again, the coe¢ cients are signif-
icant and have the expected sign. Table 11 presents the estimates for the cost function.12
All the parameters are signicant and have the expected sign. Costs increase with wages
and production. The production process is characterized by increasing returns to scale
since the production parameter 3 is signicantly lower than 1. The coe¢ cient of the
10Note issued by the U.S. Department of Transportation on the 20th May 1996.
11European Commission MEMO/09/168. 20th April 2009.
12We also estimated a long run cost function where capital was regarded as a variable input. Accord-
ingly, a measure for the price of capital was computed from the companiesaccounting data and included
in the cost function. This variable was not signicant at any condence level.
17
time trend is negatively signed, suggesting the presence of technological progress. Air-
linesnetwork size and average stage length have a negative impact on operating cost.
Thus, companies with larger networks and/or longer routes enjoy a signicant cost ad-
vantage. Finally, we also introduce in the cost function our alliance (ALLI) dummy
variable to test whether airlinesoperating costs are reduced if airlines enter into coop-
erative agreements. The results suggest that alliances have no direct e¤ect on cost since
the ALLI e¤ect is not signicant.
Hence, it seems that alliances between airlines reduce prices signicantly but they
have no direct e¤ect on costs. We expect however alliances to have a positive impact
on the quantity of passengers kilometers carried (Whalen, 2007), which in turn leads to
a decrease of airlinesaverage costs due to the presence of economies of density. Thus,
alliances mostly increase the ow of passengers inside the existing network, and thus
reduce airlinescosts, but it does not a¤ect their cost technology.
9 The competition e¤ect of alliances
We propose now to discuss further our previous ndings in light of the average competitive
behaviour of each airline. Provided with the demand, capacity, and cost estimates, we
measure the degree of competition in the industry after the introduction of alliances.
We evaluate alliancesmarginal costs and margins and shed light on whether the pricing
behavior of airlines which are members of alliances is similar to an hypothetical Nash
pricing behavior.
Provided with the cost and demand ingredients, each airline solves the following pro-
gram,
max
pi
i = qi()pi   C((qi(); ); !i; zi); (10)
where pi is the optimal price to be chosen. The rst order conditions for rm i, which
entails Nash pricing, is given by
pi   0(qi()) MCi((qi()))
pi
=  qi
pi
@pi
@qi
; (11)
where
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MCi() =@Ci
@Qi
and 0(qi()) = @Qi
@qi
:
Using the estimates of the cost, capacity and demand system obtained in the previous
section, we can evaluate the observed price-cost margins Mi =
pi 0(qi()) MCi((qi()))
pi
, and
test these margins against those that could be obtained if airlines obeyed to Nash behavior,
where rms set prices independently, since each rm i only cares for its own demand qi.13
From the expressions of demand (5), capacity (8) and costs (6), the price rst-order
condition under Nash behavior can be rewritten as
pi   1 Qiqi MCi()
pi
=  qi
pi
1
1
: (12)
Through the estimation of the cost function, the marginal costs MCi can be easily
recovered. Putting them together with our estimate of the capacity-demand elasticity 1,
as well as the observed values for supply, demand and prices, we are able to evaluate the
weighted price-marginal cost margin Mi set by each airline. Then, we can compare these
values with those predicted by the Nash scenario proposed above.
Table 12 presents the estimated values for marginal costs MCi, and margins Mi,
for all rms and alliances. Several results are worth emphasizing. First, the average
airline enjoys a positive margin. Second, distinguishing companies belonging to alliances
from companies outside alliances, it seems that companies within alliances obtain higher
margins. These companies face however lower marginal costs and set lower prices. Third,
note that prices, marginal costs, and margins vary signicantly across alliances. A striking
result is the average margin of Qualiyer which is close to 0. This could be related to the
negative prot obtained by some of its airlines for several years, illustrating the nancial
di¢ culties of the alliance, which stopped its operations in 2001 after the bankruptcies of
Swissair and Sabena.
Using our estimates for the demand equation, note that, as suggested by the right-
hand side of Equation (11), Nash behavior would entail an average marginMTN for all the
13By estimating cost and demand functions, we are able to generate direct measures of the price-cost
margins. This approach follows the spirit of Genesove and Mullin (1998), which shows that direct estima-
tions of the conduct parameter through the pricing rule may lead to signicant underestimation of market
power. Similarly, imposing a specic conduct and estimating costs may lead to over or underestimation
of costs when perfect competition or monopoly are assumed respectively. On the contrary, estimates are
quite insensitive to the assumed demand functional form.
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airlines in the sample equal to 0:707. On average, the industrys real margin MT = 0:122
does not entail pure Nash behavior. It is also worth distinguishing airlines that belong to
alliances and those that do not. We have suggested that companies within alliances were
setting the highest margins. We also calculate an average individual Nash margin for each
group. Note that, from the ratio qi=pi, evaluated at the average observation of the sample,
it can be seen that the airlines within alliances meet demand on a more inelastic portion of
the curve than other companies. Hence, pure Nash behavior for companies inside alliances
entails a marginMAN equal to 0.950, while for other companies the margin, M
NA
N , is equal
to 0.677. Hence, the values of these actual margins lie below the individual Nash behavior
margins. Hence, individual Nash behavior is not met for any set of companies. However,
the companies within alliances are closer to individual Nash behavior than the other
airlines, suggesting that they are more likely to survive in the long run. Finally, we can
evaluate an average Nash margin for each alliance. Airlines inside these alliances show
a behavior that is di¤erent from individual Nash. According to our results, Airlines in
SkyTeam and Star Alliance are those characterized by the less competitive behavior. Note
that Star Alliance includes six airlines, namely United, Lufthansa, all Nippon, SAS, Thai,
and Mexicana, whose networks are substitutes to other airlinesnetworks inside the same
alliance.
Finally, we can play the role of the benevolent regulator and propose alternative al-
liance formations in order to avoid substituting networks inside the same alliance. We
adopt the following rules: (i) If two airlines are substitutes inside the same alliance, the
smaller airline (in terms of seats-kilometers, see Table 1) must switch alliance. (ii) A
switching airline cannot join an alliance if it is a substitute to any member of the alliance
it joins. (iii) We attempt to keep alliances balanced from a geographical point of view.
(iv) We exclude Qualiyer from this reconstructing process.
The results would be as follows: British Airways must leave OneWorld but cannot join
any other alliance; it may therefore create a new alliance with, say, U.S. Airways, which
is not a member of any alliance during this period. British Airways could be replaced in
OneWorld by Lufthansa, which has to exit Star Alliance. Moreover, Cathay (OneWorld)
could be replaced by Japan Air System, which is not a member of any alliance, All Nippon
(Star Alliance) by Cathay (OneWorld), and Mexicana (Star Alliance) would exchange seat
with Aeromexico (SkyTeam).
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Table 1: List of airlines included in the Dataset 
 
Airline Seats-kil.  
 
Airline Seats-kil. 
     
United Airlines 272,380,784  Aeromexico 16,770,044 
American Airlines 250,920,342  Mexicana 15,942,627 
Delta Airlines 224,202,461  Finnair 13,409,143 
Northwest 153,461,676  Olympic 13,157,697 
British Airways 144,535,575  TAP 12,837,742 
Japan Airlines 112,853,559  Continental Micronesia 9,200,909 
Continental Airlines 108,316,288  Aer Lingus 8,662,699 
Lufthansa 103,576,477  Avianca 7,275,610 
U.S. Air 95,375,781  LOT 6,707,159 
Air France 94,723,686  Air Lanka 6,628,365 
All Nippon Airways 79,336,012  Air Europa 4,987,922 
Qantas 78,106,832  British Midland 4,819,388 
KLM 70,075,874  Spanair 4,682,385 
TWA 59,716,643  Braathens 4,536,869 
Cathay Pacific 56,506,464  Malev 4,029,375 
Air Canada 51,470,679  Cyprus Airways 3,889,153 
Alitalia 51,433,485  Air UK 3,393,372 
Thai Airways 47,788,381  Meridiana 3,316,857 
Iberia 43,128,693  Mea Air Liban 3,233,606 
Swissair 38,245,227  Gb Airways 1,770,826 
America West 37,929,149  Jersey European 1,228,033 
Canadian Airlines 35,288,169  Croatia Airlines 1,020,691 
Varig 35,199,155  Maersk Air 727,783 
SAS 31,500,448  Lithuanian Airlines 623,836 
Virgin Atlantic 26,642,135  Estonian Air 408,050 
Alaska Airlines 25,589,388  Air Baltic 268,564 
Japan Air system 22,201,996  Air Botswana 109,663 
Sabena 20,714,658    
 
Note. Seats-kilometers supplied: Average between 1995 and 2000. 
Table 2: Alliances 
 
Alliance Carrier Date of entry 
     
OneWorld American Airlines  Sep. 98 
  British Airways Sep. 98 
  Qantas Sep. 98 
  Cathay Sep. 98 
  Iberia Sep. 99 
  Finnair Sep. 99 
 Canadian Feb 99 
  Aer Lingus Jun. 00 
   
 SkyTeam Delta Sep. 99 
  Air France Sep. 99 
  Alitalia Jul. 01 
 Aeromexico Sep. 99 
   
 Star Alliance United May. 97 
  Lufthansa May. 97 
  All Nippon Oct. 99 
 Air Canada May. 97 
  Thai May. 97 
  Varig Oct. 97 
  SAS May. 97 
  Mexicana Jul. 99 
  LOT Jun. 03 
  British Midland Jul. 00 
  Spanair Jun. 03 
   
 Wings Northwest 89 
 KLM 89 
 Continental 89 
   
Qualiflyer Swissair Mar. 98 
  Sabena Mar. 98 
  TAP Mar. 98 
  LOT Jan. 00 
  Air Europa Mar. 99 
 
Note:“Date of entry” refers to the date at which the carrier joins the alliance. 
 
Figure 1: Network overlapping 
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Figure 2: Hub overlapping 
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Hubs: 
 
H1: Airline 1 
H2: Airline 2 
 
Routes:  
 
 Airline 1 
 Airline 2 
H1 
H1 
H2 H1 
H2 
H2 
Table 3: Overlapping pairs 
 
Airline Pair Index Airline Pair Index 
    
All Nippon – Japan Airlines 0.5641 Air France – Japan Airlines 0.0907 
Delta – TWA 0.3860 British Airways - United 0.0859 
Aeromexico – America West 0.3484 Lufthansa – Thai 0.0854 
SAS – Thai 0.3358 All Nippon – Sabena 0.0834 
Continental - TWA 0.3118 Japan Air System - Northwest 0.0827 
Air UK – Spanair 0.3063 United – Virgin 0.0827 
Continental - Delta 0.2670 Delta – Swissair 0.0826 
British Airways - Virgin 0.2400 British Airways - Delta 0.0825 
Aeromexico – Mexicana 0.2383 British Airways - Qantas 0.0812 
Continental Micro. – Japan Air Sys. 0.1858 Qantas – United 0.0799 
Air Europa – Spanair 0.1829 Alitalia – TWA 0.0786 
Japan Airlines - United 0.1812 Air France – Thai Airways 0.0779 
Olympic - TWA 0.1795 Continental - Mexicana 0.0773 
Mexicana - USAIR 0.1539 Continental – Virgin 0.0757 
Air UK – British Midland 0.1536 Delta – Virgin 0.0752 
Qantas - Thai 0.1522 Japan Airlines - Virgin 0.0752 
British Airways - Continental 0.1518 Air Europa – Iberia 0.0735 
American – Delta 0.1501 Japan Airlines - Lufthansa 0.0734 
Canadian Airlines – Cathay 0.1413 Delta – SAS 0.0713 
Japan Airlines - Northwest 0.1374 Air Canada – British Airways 0.0698 
Delta - Lufthansa 0.1364 Continental – Japan Air sys. 0.0698 
Air Canada – Canadian Airlines 0.1355 Air UK – KLM 0.0693 
Aeromexico – Iberia 0.1314 Air Europa – TWA 0.0689 
Olympic - Thai 0.1307 Swissair – Varig 0.0686 
All Nippon – Northwest 0.1288 British Airways - USAIR 0.0680 
Continental - SAS 0.1263 Delta – Sabena 0.0669 
Alitalia – Thai 0.1261 TAP – TWA 0.0660 
TAP - Varig 0.1242 Delta – United 0.0656 
Japan Airlines – Japan Air System 0.1191 Air France – TWA 0.0647 
American – Continental 0.1178 Air France – All Nippon Airw 0.0641 
Mexicana - United 0.1173 Continental - Lufthansa 0.0640 
American – British Airways 0.1126 Japan Air System – United 0.0637 
British Airways - Thai 0.1116 Air France – United 0.0636 
Lufthansa - United 0.1101 Cont. Micro. – Japan Airl. 0.0631 
American – United 0.1066 Iberia – Varig 0.0630 
Northwest - Qantas 0.1049 Japan Airlines - Thai 0.0626 
All Nippon – Qantas 0.1046 Cathay – Swissair 0.0624 
All Nippon – Virgin 0.1028 Air Canada – Iberia 0.0620 
Japan Airlines - Qantas 0.0988 Olympic – Qantas 0.0619 
Continental Micronesia – Northwest 0.0987 All Nippon – Cont. Micro. 0.0618 
All Nippon – United 0.0980 Delta – Varig 0.0614 
Aeromexico – Continental 0.0948 American – Lufthansa 0.0613 
Cathay – Qantas 0.0930 Iberia – TWA 0.0613 
Air UK – Cathay 0.0922 …  
Note: Only the first 87 over a total of 444 overlapping airline pairs are presented here. 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 
(Annual data, 1995-2000, 55 airlines) 
 
Variable Mean Stand. Dev. Min Max 
     
Costs (103 $) 2,465,913 172,663 11,820 14,901,114 
Wages ($) 14,969 510 773 59,094 
Price Fuel (index) 162.68 1.94 88.21 283.76 
     
Price ticket ($/Pass.kil) 0.117 0.003 0.032 0.303 
Production (Seats-kil) 45,906,516 3,450,119 96,609 284,044,940 
Demand (Pass-kil) 32,439,265 2,469,556 50,994 204,149,480 
Network size (kil) 271,083 14,508 1,467 1,075,683 
Av. Stage Length (kil) 1,385 57 277 8,978 
# Routes 193.58 9.56 1.52 809.57 
# Departures 177,587 12,315 4,029 968,893 
     
Priv. Cons. (index) 1443.70 117.44 1.29 6683.8 
     
Competition (index) 0.619 0.029 0.001 1.964 
     
Alliance 0.118    
OneWorld 0.027    
Star Alliance 0.060    
Wings 0.061    
SkyTeam 0.009    
Qualiflyer 0.021    
 
Table 5: Prices 
 
Variable I II III IV V 
      
CONST -4.70*** 
(0.26) 
-1.01 
(2.19) 
-2.65*** 
(0.07) 
-4.65*** 
(0.25) 
-4.69*** 
(0.29) 
TREND -0.07*** 
(0.01)) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.04*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
-0.06*** 
(0.01) 
PRIV 0.41*** 
(0.05) 
0.41*** 
(0.04) 
 0.39*** 
(0.04) 
0.40*** 
(0.05) 
POP  -0.22* 
(0.13) 
   
WAGES   0.04 
(0.03) 
  
ALL    -0.05** 
(0.02) 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
ALL×COMP     -0.06* 
(0.03) 
Error Dev. 0.09*** 
(0.003) 
0.09*** 
(0.003) 
0.09*** 
(0.003) 
0.09*** 
(0.02) 
0.09*** 
(0.003) 
R Squared 0.96     
Mean Log-likelihood 1.92     
# of observations 330 330 330 330 330 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***
 Significant at the 1% level; 
**
significant at the 5% level; 
*
significant at the 10% level. 
Table 6: Demand I (Network) 
 
Variable Par A I II III IV V 
        
CONST  0.97** 
(0.47) 
1.04** 
(0.47) 
1.03** 
(0.47) 
1.09** 
(0.47) 
0.99** 
(0.47) 
0.98** 
(0.48) 
NET  0.21*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.02) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
NET×OWN PRICE  -0.88*** 
(0.15) 
     
NET×OWN PRICE 2   -0.95*** 
(0.16) 
-0.96*** 
(0.16) 
-0.98*** 
(0.17) 
-0.94*** 
(0.16) 
-0.94*** 
(0.16) 
PRICE_O  0.77** 
(0.32) 
0.73** 
(0.35) 
0.73** 
(0.32) 
0.72** 
(0.33) 
0.75** 
(0.32) 
0.75** 
(0.32) 
PRICE_C  -0.17** 
(0.07) 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.17** 
(0.07) 
-0.17** 
(0.07) 
PRIV
  0.25** 
(0.11) 
0.28** 
(0.11) 
0.28** 
(0.11) 
0.25** 
(0.11) 
0.28** 
(0.11) 
0.28** 
(0.11) 
Error Dev.  0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
0.22*** 
(0.01) 
        
R
2  0.76      
        
Own Price Elasticity  -1.73 
(0.11) 
-1.77 
(0.11) 
-1.77 
(0.11) 
-1.78 
(0.10) 
-1.79 
(0.11) 
-1.78 
(0.11) 
        
        
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***
 Significant at the 1% level; 
**
significant at the 5% level; 
*
significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 7: Demand II (Departures) 
 
Variable Par I II III IV V 
       
CONST  1.06*** 
(0.34) 
1.05*** 
(0.34) 
1.06*** 
(0.33) 
1.02*** 
(0.34) 
1.00*** 
(0.34) 
DEP  0.29*** 
(0.01) 
0.29*** 
(0.01) 
0.29*** 
(0.01) 
0.29*** 
(0.01) 
0.29*** 
(0.01) 
DEP×OWN PRICE  -1.48*** 
(0.14) 
-1.49*** 
(0.14) 
-1.53*** 
(0.14) 
-1.48*** 
(0.14) 
-1.48*** 
(0.14) 
PRICE_O  2.02*** 
(0.19) 
2.02*** 
(0.19) 
2.01*** 
(0.19) 
2.03*** 
(0.19) 
2.03*** 
(0.19) 
PRICE_C  -0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.17*** 
(0.05) 
-0.16*** 
(0.05) 
PRIV
  -0.02*** 
(0.005) 
-0.01*** 
(0.005) 
-0.02*** 
(0.005) 
-0.02*** 
(0.006) 
-0.02*** 
(0.005) 
       
Error Dev.  0.15*** 
(0.006) 
0.15*** 
(0.005) 
0.15*** 
(0.006) 
0.15*** 
(0.06) 
0.15*** 
(0.005) 
       
R
2  0.88     
       
Own Price Elasticity  -1.53 
(0.11) 
-1.53 
(0.11) 
-1.51 
(0.10) 
-1.53 
(0.11) 
-1.54 
(0.11) 
       
       
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***
 Significant at the 1% level; 
**
significant at the 5% level; 
*
significant at the 10% level 
Table 8: Demand III (Routes) 
 
Variable Par I II III IV V 
       
CONST  1.06** 
(0.47) 
1.05** 
(0.47) 
1.14** 
(0.47) 
1.02** 
(0.47) 
1.01** 
(0.47) 
ROUTES  0.26*** 
(0.02) 
0.26*** 
(0.02) 
0.27*** 
(0.02) 
0.26*** 
(0.02) 
0.26*** 
(0.02) 
ROUTES×OWN PRICE  -1.35*** 
(0.19) 
-1.35*** 
(0.19) 
-1.41*** 
(0.20) 
-1.33*** 
(0.19) 
-1.33*** 
(0.19) 
PRICE_O  1.39*** 
(0.30) 
1.39*** 
(0.30) 
1.37*** 
(0.30) 
1.41*** 
(0.30) 
1.41*** 
(0.30) 
PRICE_C  -0.19*** 
(0.07) 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.20*** 
(0.07) 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
-0.18** 
(0.07) 
PRIV
  0.07*** 
(0.006) 
0.07*** 
(0.006) 
0.07*** 
(0.006) 
0.07*** 
(0.006) 
0.07*** 
(0.006) 
       
Error Dev.  0.21*** 
(0.008) 
0.21*** 
(0.008) 
0.21*** 
(0.008) 
0.21*** 
(0.01) 
0.21*** 
(0.01) 
       
R
2  0.77     
       
Own Price Elasticity  -1.99 
(0.12) 
-1.98 
(0.12) 
-1.99 
(0.12) 
-1.99 
(0.12) 
-1.98 
(0.12) 
       
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***
 Significant at the 1% level; 
**
significant at the 5% level; 
*
significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 9: Pairs of substitute carriers 
 
Airline Pair Index Airline Pair Index 
    
All Nippon – Japan Airlines 0.5641 American – Continental 0.1178 
Delta – TWA 0.3860 Mexicana – United 0.1173 
Aeromexico – America West 0.3484 American – British Airways 0.1126 
SAS – Thai 0.3358 British Airways – Thai 0.1116 
Continental – TWA 0.3118 Lufthansa – United 0.1101 
Air UK – Spanair 0.3063 American – United 0.1066 
Continental – Delta 0.2670 Northwest – Qantas 0.1049 
British Airways – Virgin 0.2400 All Nippon – Qantas 0.1046 
Aeromexico – Mexicana 0.2383 All Nippon – Virgin 0.1028 
Continental Micro. – Japan Air Sys. 0.1858 Japan Airlines – Qantas 0.0988 
Air Europa – Spanair 0.1829 Continental Micro – Northwest 0.0987 
Japan Airlines – United 0.1812 All Nippon – United 0.0980 
Olympic – TWA 0.1795 Aeromexico – Continental 0.0948 
Mexicana – USAIR 0.1539 Cathay – Qantas 0.0930 
Air UK – British Midland 0.1536 Air UK – Cathay 0.0922 
Qantas – Thai 0.1522 Air France – Japan Airlines 0.0907 
British Airways - Continental 0.1518 British Airways - United 0.0859 
American – Delta 0.1501 Lufthansa – Thai 0.0854 
Canadian Airlines – Cathay 0.1413 All Nippon – Sabena 0.0834 
Japan Airlines – Northwest 0.1374 Japan Air System - Northwest 0.0827 
Delta – Lufthansa 0.1364 United – Virgin 0.0827 
Air Canada – Canadian Airlines 0.1355 Delta – Swissair 0.0826 
Aeromexico – Iberia 0.1314 British Airways – Delta 0.0825 
Olympic – Thai 0.1307 British Airways – Qantas 0.0812 
All Nippon – Northwest 0.1288 Qantas – United 0.0799 
Continental – SAS 0.1263 Alitalia – TWA 0.0786 
Alitalia – Thai 0.1261 Air France – Thai Airways 0.0779 
TAP – Varig 0.1242 Continental – Mexicana 0.0773 
Japan Airlines – Japan Air System 0.1191   
 
Table 10: Demand-Capacity relationship 
 
Variable Parameter 
  
CONST 1.58*** 
(0.28) 
q 0.92*** 
(0.01) 
Error Dev. 0.05*** 
(0.002) 
  
R
2 0.99 
  
 
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***
 Significant at the 1% level; 
**
significant at 
the 5% level; 
*
significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 11: Cost function 
 
Variable A A2 
   
CONSTANT -4.95*** 
(0.24) 
-4.99*** 
(0.25) 
WAGE 0.24*** 
(0.02) 
0.24*** 
(0.02) 
Q 0.93*** 
(0.02) 
0.93*** 
(0.02) 
NET -0.07** 
(0.03) 
-0.07** 
(0.03) 
ASL -0.38*** 
(0.04) 
-0.38*** 
(0.04) 
TREND -0.15*** 
(0.03) 
-0.15*** 
(0.03) 
ALL  -0.03 
(0.06) 
Error Dev. 0.30*** 
(0.01) 
0.30*** 
(0.01) 
   
R
2 0.97  
   
Note: Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***
 Significant at the 1% level; 
**
significant at the 5% level; 
*
significant at the 10% level. 
 
Table 12. Marginal costs, prices, and margins. 
 
Alliance Price Marginal cost Real Margin Nash Margin 
All carriers 
0.129** 
(0.061) 
0.074** 
(0.035)) 
0.122 
(0.349) 
0.707 
(0.499) 
Carriers within alliances 
0.099*** 
(0.029) 
0.056*** 
(0.018) 
0.234 
(0.199) 
0.950*** 
(0.342) 
Carriers outside alliances 
0.132** 
(0.063) 
0.076** 
(0.036)) 
0.108 
(0.360) 
0.677 
(0.507) 
OneWorld 
0.102*** 
(0.025) 
0.056*** 
(0.011) 
0.244*** 
(0.080) 
1.487*** 
(0.246) 
SkyTeam 
0.095*** 
(0.003) 
0.049*** 
(0.008) 
0.328*** 
(0.121) 
1.011*** 
(0.007) 
Qualiflyer 
0.095*** 
(0.016) 
0.067*** 
(0.013) 
0.022 
(0.266) 
0.751*** 
(0.211) 
Star Alliance 
0.101*** 
(0.035) 
0.053** 
(0.021) 
0.308*** 
(0.103) 
0.930*** 
(0.317) 
Wings 
0.148** 
(0.061) 
0.087** 
(0.041) 
0.192 
(0.175) 
0.959 
(0.587) 
Notes:  Price: One passenger-kilometer in Dollars. MC: One seat-kilometer in Dollars. 
Standard errors are in parenthesis. 
***
 Significant at the 1% level; 
**
significant at the 5% level; 
*
significant at the 10% level. 
 
